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DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS FOR THE WAR AFTER NEXT
You gentlemen, therefore, have a most important responsibility, to recognize that your education is just beginning, and to be prepared, in the most difficult period in the life of our country, to play the role that the country hopes and needs and expects from you. You must understand not only this country but other countries. You must know something about strategy and tactics and logic-logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone. Year group 2006 officers will serve the first seven years of their careers in a time tested junior leader development model specifically tailored for company grade officers. At the seven year mark in their careers, they will undergo career field designation. 3 The assumption is that the current company grade model will meet the needs of the Army for the foreseeable future and is thus beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper focuses on the development of operations career field officers starting after the seventh year of service. These officers serve as the "pool" of leaders most likely to serve as strategic leaders after successful command at ready for "other than operational" training, education, and experiential opportunities.
Analysis of War Winners
The Second World War produced a bevy of superior strategic leaders. Names like MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Marshall are testament to the quality of leaders shaped by the crucible of World War II. These leaders were developed in an age without OPMS, and graduate school was the exception rather than the rule for the education of the officer corps. 4 In lieu of post graduate education, these key leaders were shaped by their skills and experiences.
Strategic leaders from World War II, like the strategic leaders of today, also lived in a state of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The challenges they faced were as difficult,
if not more so, than those faced by current strategic leaders. What can we learn from their specific pre-war shaping experiences? Should these experiences be part of a modern 21 st century strategic leader development model? Examination of the "formative years", from commissioning to assumption of general officer rank, should provide clues as to the making of a successful strategic leader.
Although each of the strategic leaders from this era possessed unique educational and developmental experiences, they also shared certain common experiences. Like most officers of the day, these leaders all served successfully at the company level following commissioning. Operations Command. 22 Such was the quality of General Schoomaker's strategic leadership that he was called back from retirement to serve as the Army Chief of Staff. This is even more notable since it occurred after the attacks of 9-11.
Key Skills and Experiences of the "War Fighters"
The "war fighters" reflect a wide range of non-traditional skills and experiences. Each of these strategic leaders had assignments that offered time for study and reflection. Generals
Casey and Abizaid had the unique opportunity to spend a year in the United Nations environment. General Abizaid had the greatest opportunity for study and reflection considering his time as an Olmsted Scholar. While all of the officers had graduate degrees of one type or another, none served as an instructor or an advisor.
Lessons Learned from the Study of the Generals
The Army has changed dramatically since the early 1900's, and the skills and experiences of the Army's current strategic leaders have also changed significantly. The "war winners" spent, on average, less time in the tactical Army and more time as instructors and advisors than the "war fighters". "War fighters" and "war winners" both had the opportunity for self study and reflection, although General Schoomaker less so because of his vast amount of time in SOF.
All of the generals had the experience of seeing the inner workings of high level Army staffs and congress prior to reaching general officer rank. Interestingly, none of them had any experience working closely with the National Guard.
Although not conclusive, the "war winners" were more likely to serve extended periods of time on detached service from the "tactical Army". General Eisenhower spent three years "seconded" to the Philippine Army, as did General MacArthur. General Bradley's eight years of teaching experience at West Point certainly sets his developmental experience apart from that of today's "war fighters". From the available information it appears that "war winners" had a much greater opportunity for thoughtful reflection and a much broader contact with non-military members of society. By almost any definition the future will be more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous than it is today. Strategic leaders of the future must be prepared to deal with those challenges. A key difference between the world we live in today and the world that strategic leaders will face in 2036 is that it will have seen three decades worth of rise of the trans-national threats that we first faced on 9-11. The trans-national nature of the enemy is a bi-product of globalization. Riva Kastoryano, in her essay "The Reach of Trans-nationalism", states that trans-nationalism is a condition that creates a situation where increasing mobility and the development of communication (via the internet) have intensified trans-border relations, leading to social and political mobilizations beyond traditional geographical and national boundaries. 25 It is very likely that the "threats" strategic leaders of 2036 will face are the foot soldiers of the current day terrorist movements.
To be effective, future strategic leaders must have a working knowledge of globalization and trans-nationalism. Understanding why the West, and the United States in particular, is viewed as an oppressor in the new global arena will be key to understanding how potential adversaries think and act. This type of experience can best be learned by focused study, actual experience in a global environment (governmental, social, or economic), or a combination of both. Having a working knowledge of the effects of globalization and trans-nationalism and an understanding of perceived victimization by the "have nots" is a critical trait for future strategic leaders.
The need to understand globalization and trans-nationalism are traits that the historical "war winners" did not need to possess because they did not exist. The end of the Second World
War introduced the start of the true shift to globalization. Since 1945, the differences in wealth and prosperity between "first world" nations and "third world" nations has broadened and grown wider. 26 This gap, compounded by exponential increases in the speed of communications and the rapid growth of technological capability of the "first world" feed the perception of prosecution and victimization by the "third world". These challenges face today's strategic leaders (the "war fighters"), and will certainly grow in importance to the strategic leaders of 2036.
The Rise of "BRIC" and the Impact on Strategic Leaders
It is estimated that globalization and growth will lead to drastic redistribution of wealth in the first half of the 21 st Century. For the strategist this also means that there may be a corresponding shift in strategic alliances as the United States grows new partnerships and interests. Chief among these are the so-called "BRIC" nations: Brazil, Russia, India and China.
These nations are important from a strategic sense because the assumption is that their militaries will grow in importance as they move to protect their own interests. Will the coalitions of the U.S., Britain, and Australia be replaced by the "BRIC"? Goldman-Sachs estimates that India's economy could actually be larger than Japan's by the year 2032. 27 Estimates for the other elements of "BRIC" are similar. The same report suggests that by 2025 BRIC nations could account for over half the size of the six major industrialized democracies (referred to as the G6) and in less than 40 years, the combined BRIC economies could be larger than the G6. 28 How this will shift the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and in other arenas, is anyone's guess. The chances are that from a strategic view, India, like the rest of "BRIC" will play a much larger role on the international stage.
In order to prepare strategic leaders for success in 2036, we must look now at innovative ways to prepare them for the cultural landscape they will encounter. Innovation in this sense refers to focused, professional, and sustained language, cultural, and geographic immersion for Staff College. 31 After graduation a very small percentage of these future leaders will in fact experience the FCS first hand before they depart the "tactical Army" for more broadening developmental experiences.
It is imperative that future senior leaders remain abreast of the technological developments FCS will bring to the land forces commander. The obvious requirement is a combination of experience, education, and exposure to ensure full synthesis of FCS impacts at the strategic level. This is best accomplished by a dedicated system of continuous learning during the full career of the officer corps. The objective is to ensure that year group 2006 officers do not suffer the same fate as year group 1888 officers did in 1918 when they learned first hand, on the battlefield, the effects of the machinegun, tank, and airplane at the cost of many thousands of lives.
Considerations from "Lessons Predicted"
The future poses many challenges for strategic leaders. While some of these challenges can be adequately addressed through distance learning and enhanced through self study and reflection, others can not. Each of the challenges-Globalization and trans-nationalism, language and culture due to BRIC and technology due to FCS-merits a different approach. Not every officer can receive the same level of education and exposure to address these challenges; however, a proposed solution to selecting the right officer for the appropriate level of effort will be addressed in the conclusion of this essay. Enhanced education is a corner stone of the current OPMS. In addition to traditional advanced civil schooling (ACS) opportunities, the Army has recently begun to offer expanded graduate school opportunities (Expanded Graduate School Program-EGSP). EGSP offers graduate school opportunities to outstanding officers in order to enhance development of the broader intellectual capital required in a Joint and Expeditionary Army. 34 Under EGSP, officers will have the opportunity to attend graduate school between their 8th and 12th years of service.
What is uniquely different from the existing ACS program is that following graduation, officers return to the field for a follow-on key developmental assignment and not to a "pay back" tour outside the Operations Career Field. EGSP requires officers to study in an approved discipline such as cultural awareness, regional knowledge, foreign language, governance, diplomacy, national security, or social sciences. 35 If selected, year group 2006 officers should expect to attend EGSP between 2014 and 2018 for a period of 12-18 months.
Following on the theory that there is no single path for career management and professional development, OPMS offers opportunities to help develop multi-skilled leaders by assigning them to tours of duty in joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, or multi-national (JIIM) arena. These opportunities, not necessarily a traditional 24 or 36 month tour, may in fact be 90, 180, or 365 days in length. Additionally, where in the past joint duty was strictly controlled, in the future the possibility exists whereby officers can do "focused tours" of short duration to gain specific skills and experiences that lead to an overall broadening of their experience base. 36 The objective is to have the officer garner the experience, gain a breadth of development, and return with that knowledge to the operational Army. 37 Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders Task Force (RETAL TF) The RETAL TF, established by Headquarters, Department of the Army on 6 July 2005, was instrumental in helping to define how the Army should develop its military and civilian leaders to "…become pentathletes needed to operate and win in the 21 st Century national security environment". 38 Building on OPMS, the RETAL TF developed the Army pentathlete leader model. This model provides structure and form to the concepts outlined in OPMS, specifically that leaders should be possess additional skills that enable them to become strategic and creative thinkers, skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy, and understand the cultural context of the operational environment.
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The RETAL TF determined that the current Leadership Development Model, though effective, has not kept pace with change. 40 By defining the pentathlete leader model, and identifying accompanying skill set requirements, the RETAL TF provides a "way ahead" to implement the vision of OPMS. Both characteristics and competencies must be gained, and a review of OPMS shows that there are plans in place (moving away from a prescriptive career path, EGSP, and JIIM assignment opportunities) to address these gaps in leader development.
Not addressed in the RETAL TF report is the process by which an already very busy officer corps can afford the opportunities to gain the pentathlete-like skill sets. The report does indicate that the leader development process requires a paradigm shift to address current shortfalls. That shift already underway is evidenced by the recent and continuing changes to OPMS.
Recommendations: The Need for a Paradigm Shift
The Army is making significant strides in improving and enhancing an already very capable leader development program. That OPMS is classified as an "evolving system" by General Schoomaker is a testament to the fact that we live in an era of increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. 41 To enhance the development of the future strategic leaders it is important to recognize the positive steps taken by the continued revision of OPMS and the recommendations of the RETAL TF especially with regard to the pentathlete model.
Beyond these steps, exists a requirement for a very real paradigm shift in the way we look at senior leader development if we are to prepare for the strategic environment of 2036. This shift is in the areas of accessions, field grade officer management, and program of continuous education of the officer corps throughout the entire duration of an officer's career using distance and web-based learning assets.
Accessions
Realizing that the strategic environment of the future will be more globalizes and that U.S.
interests will be dominated by both the rise of BRIC nations and our unrelenting need to stay engaged in the Middle East, we must seek the cultural high ground in the area of language and cultural skills. A brief look at BRIC language skills for year group 2006 shows that the Army's future crop of strategic leaders, if not remedied, will be wholly unprepared to deal on a personal level with the leaders from these countries without the use of interpreters. The paradigm shift necessary to address this issue is to require and fund pre-commissioning language study.
Army Regulation 611-6, Army Linguist Management, establishes standards for varying levels of language proficiency ranging from a "0" (indicating no proficiency) to a "5" (indicating functional native proficiency). Using this standard as a guideline, requirements for each commissioning source could be determined in order to establish a baseline of language proficiency. Each of the three primary commissioning sources, the United States Military Academy (USMA), the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and the Officer Candidate
School (OCS), should have a slightly different approach to addressing language proficiency.
For USMA the current requirement for language could be enhanced and expanded.
USMA currently offers instruction in all of the BRIC languages, save the Indian dialects. years. The difficulty lies in determining how to select the right officers for the appropriate education and training opportunities, specifically who will have one of the limited opportunities for a JIIM assignment. The study of both the "war winners" and the "war fighters" did not illuminate any clear education or skill development path. Each officer had a unique, and often very non-traditional, assignment and education history. The "take away" from studying these officer's careers was that, as firmly stated in OPMS, there is no prescribed path to promotion and higher command.
Although there is no scripted path to success, and timelines are out of vogue when discussing professional development, the fact is that each officer has certain decision points in his or her career that are inflexible and must be addressed. Chief among these decision points are promotion boards. Promotion boards offer an opportunity to add structure and credibility to the JIIM selection process. Additionally, promotion boards also serve to help identify those officers who should be singled out for special education and career management. The field grade promotion process lends itself to the establishment of a focused strategic leader development program by identifying officers selected for below the zone promotion.
The following figures detail an enhanced strategic leader development model for field grade officers. The purpose of this program is to manage advanced language and culture education opportunities as well as limited JIIM assignments. Advanced cultural and language education is tied directly to selection for below the zone promotion. Once an officer is selected for below the zone promotion (at any field grade, but for the purposes of this example, to the rank of major), he or she is placed into a phased program that provides an educational opportunity (language and culture) as well as a focused JIIM assignment. This focused education experience is designed to empower the officer with a better understanding of the culture, language and issues at the strategic level from an "other than Army" perspective. It For the purposes of this example and to point out the flexibility of this approach, this particular officer could be in EGSP at the time of his below the zone selection for major. It is envisioned that the officer would complete graduate school, and then immediately attend another 12 month degree producing language course at a designated university, followed by an appropriate JIIM assignment. The goal would be to link the language and culture education to the JIIM assignment (Chinese to Pacific Command, Brazilian to Southern Command, etc.).
Note that after 18 months, the officer is programmed into Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and therefore not disadvantaged from re-joining his cohort year group in their continued professional development.
The paradigm shift required for the success of this program is realizing that officers selected for enhanced strategic leader development must not be subjected to the ponderous and inflexible assignment policies that currently exist. This must be a Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) program where the losing command, with the exception of those deployed to combat, cannot block an officer from attending this essential educational experience. and a follow-on opportunity to serve in the region in an accompanying operational assignment.
By using this approach we can establish professional contacts in the targeted countries, gain expert knowledge and experience, and broaden the education and cultural exposure of top performing officers of the Operations Career Field. The intent is not to create a second Foreign Area Officer program, rather to build a bench of culturally savvy officers who have developed personal professional contacts and a mastery of the language and culture so they might one day make an impact at the strategic level. This may be as a colonel on a Combatant
Commander's staff, or as a Joint Task Force commander as a general officer.
This program would be restricted to a relatively small number of officers. For example, year group 1996 Operations Career Field officers were selected for below the zone promotion to major at a rate of 6.8%, or a total of 122 officers. 44 It is important to note this program would not exclude these officers from pursuing other degree producing programs, USMA instructor for example.
The impact on the lieutenant colonel and colonel population is likewise relatively minor. the aspects of mentorship and its importance, but it does not outline a specific mentor program for officers. 46 Because of the importance of mentorship to the profession of arms, it merits a program with structure and depth. Figure 6 shows an example mentor program.
A professional mentorship program for field grade officers should begin when an officer is selected for major. This process could be formalized by a petitioning and registration process whereby a senior and subordinate agree to a formal mentorship relationship. This registration could be placed in an officer's on-line Army Knowledge On-line (AKO) profile, listed on the Officer Evaluation Report and associated supporting documents. In this way senior leaders could access the information if required and contact the mentor to enhance the development of the junior officer. By formalizing this process the mentor takes professional "ownership" of the responsibility to both develop the young officer and acknowledge to the senior leadership of the Army that he or she is available to intervene and assist if the situation dictates.
The importance of mentorship cannot be underestimated and should have a more indepth treatment in FM 6-22. Specific duties and responsibilities of both the mentor and mentored should be listed, as well as suggested readings for further professional development. This type of information, "pushed" via AKO with links to additional information, would go a long way toward maintaining situational awareness.
Conclusion
The challenges the strategic leaders of the United States Army face today will only increase in the years ahead. The current leader development program, OPMS, is robust and based on the challenges we currently face in the Global War on Terror. OPMS is definitely a step in the right direction, and accurately reflects the emerging needs of the officer corps to meet the demands posed by the Global War on Terror. However, like any professional organization, we must look out to the challenges the future holds. Analysis of OPMS, the skills and experiences of past and present key strategic leaders, and the predicted impact of the rise of BRIC, technology, and globalization all point to an immediate need to continue to improve and enhance our strategic leader development model.
A relatively small investment in time and money in focused field grade career management can tackle the challenges of the language and culture gap that already exists with regard to BRIC nations and other countries of interest. A professional mentorship program could formalize and enhance a fledgling program that, to date, has only been informally described in existing manuals. Together these initiatives, combined with current OPMS doctrine, should better prepare the strategic leaders of 2036 for the environment and challenges they will likely encounter.
